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CONSTITUTION DAY LECTURE:  AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM, ALMOST (BUT NOT QUITE) 
VERSION 2.0 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr.* 
INTRODUCTION 
On February 7, 2012, a front-page article in The New York Times reported that 
the Constitution of the United States has ceased to be the leading model for 
constitution-writers in other countries.1  According to The Times, and to the law 
review article on which The Times based its report,2 the U.S. Constitution has fallen 
increasingly out of alignment with an evolving international consensus regarding 
the individual rights that a constitution ought to protect.3  In addition, the 
constitutions of other countries copy the structural provisions of the U.S. 
Constitution—involving federalism and the separation of powers—far less 
frequently than they once did.4 
As the editors of The Times undoubtedly anticipated when they put their story 
on the front page, the news that other countries no longer regard the Constitution of 
the United States as a paradigm of excellence seems likely to provoke a shock of 
surprise in many American minds.  Questions follow.  Why have other countries 
ceased to treat the U.S. Constitution as a prototype?  By reflecting on what others 
might view as deficiencies in our Constitution—most of which was written in the 
eighteenth century—can we achieve an enhanced understanding of the respective 
ways in which it may serve us well and badly in the twenty-first century?  And if 
so, how should we go forward?  
My conclusions about these matters are complex.  But the need for complexity 
may begin to emerge if I propose an intriguingly simple, and arrestingly jarring, 
answer to the question: “Why is the United States Constitution no longer the 
preeminent model for others that it once was?”  That answer, which I ultimately 
reject but which I believe needs to be taken seriously, would go as follows:  The 
United States served as a visionary innovator by developing the first written 
national constitution in the history of the world.  To adopt the vocabulary of 
modern computer software, we might think of the prototype that the Founding 
Fathers developed as written constitutionalism 1.0.  Thereafter, other liberal 
democracies began to write constitutions of their own, most of them based on the 
American model.  We might think of these early imitators as reflecting 
constitutionalism 1.1—a slightly modified version of the original.  We might then, 
similarly, characterize various constitutions that came later, still building on the 
                                                                                                     
 * Ralph S. Tyler, Jr. Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard Law School.  I am grateful to 
Alexander Dryer and Charlie Griffin for research assistance.  A version of this Essay was delivered as 
the Constitution Day Lecture at the University of Maine Law School on September 17, 2012. 
 1. Adam Liptak, ‘We the People’ Loses Followers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2012, at A1. 
 2. David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the United States Constitution, 87 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 762 (2012).  
 3. See id. at 767, 779–809. 
 4. See id. at 785–96. 
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American model and trying to learn from the earliest efforts at adapting or 
improving it, as embodying constitutionalism 1.2 or 1.3.  Indeed, as centuries 
passed and innovations continued, we might imagine that more “point” releases 
produced constitutionalism 1.4 or 1.5 elsewhere in the world.5  There is no need to 
get bogged down in details of the computer analogy.  The more important point, 
emphasized by The New York Times article to which I referred at the outset, is that 
in the past twenty-five to fifty years, constitution writers elsewhere have begun to 
exhibit a consensus not only about how to correct some of the miscalculations of 
their predecessors, but also about how to add some new functions that the 
American Founding Fathers could never have imagined.  Call the result of their 
efforts constitutionalism 2.0—a significant change to the most recent earlier 
versions of written constitutionalism and one that, as measured against 
constitutionalism 1.0, represents a paradigm shift.  With much of the rest of the 
world now enjoying the sophisticated functionality of constitutionalism 2.0, the 
United States—according to the narrative that I propose to consider—remains still 
stuck with written constitutionalism 1.0.  We may not mind.  We have never known 
anything better.  Nevertheless, the honest and slightly embarrassing truth is that we 
are living with an eighteenth-century constitution in the twenty-first century and 
that we should look to others, rather than expect others look to us, in considering 
how to go on. 
In my view, this stylized narrative contains a germ of truth, but only a germ.  
In answering the questions that I sketched a moment ago, much of my concern will 
be to identify what is wrong, as well as what is right, with the hypothesis that the 
United State is struggling along with an anachronistic Constitution 1.0, while much 
of the rest of the world has advanced to constitutionalism 2.0. 
To preview my conclusion: Although our current regime is so different from 
anything that the Founding Fathers imagined that it has achieved most if not all of 
the functionality of constitutionalism 2.0, we have got to where we are by a 
sometimes clunky and inadequately understood series of upgrades, patches, and 
work-arounds that now leave our system prone to instability and perennially at risk 
of constitutional crisis.  To push the computer analogy a little further, let me ask 
you to imagine that we are now operating with American constitutionalism 1.8.  
Many of the most fundamental design elements of constitutionalism 1.0 remain 
unchanged.  Americans cherish their Constitution and demand fidelity to it.  We 
have not abandoned constitutionalism 1.0 in favor of constitutionalism 2.0.  But we 
Americans also pride ourselves on pragmatic adaptability.  In moments of 
adaptability, we have gone far beyond where an unmodified version of 
constitutionalism 1.0 would ever have let us go.  And here is the rub: Although 
constitutionalism 1.8 works splendidly for us most of the time, the tension between 
the demands of fidelity and the felt need for pragmatic adaptability is a recurrent 
one in American constitutional practice, made worse by ideologically charged 
divisions over which adaptations are desirable and which are not.  By achieving a 
better understanding of this chronic tension in modern American constitutional 
practice, we will better situate ourselves to address and manage current and 
                                                                                                     
 5. Constitutions adopted in other nations since 1789 have had an average lifespan of nineteen 
years.  See ZACHARY ELKINS ET AL., THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 1–2 (2009).  
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looming challenges. 
I.  WHY MIGHT OTHER NATIONS REJECT THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AS A MODEL? 
Before offering a few observations about why other countries might have 
ceased to view the Constitution of the United States as a template, I should clarify 
the findings concerning the Constitution’s influence that The New York Times 
reported.  The Times based its story on an article by Professors David Law and 
Mila Versteeg published in the New York University Law Review.6  According to 
Professors Law and Versteeg, no other nation’s constitution has clearly supplanted 
the Constitution of the United States as a model for the world’s constitution-
writers.7  Instead, the authors report, near consensus has emerged among liberal 
democracies about the appropriate contents of a “generic” constitution, defined by 
the kinds of provisions that constitutions for liberal democracies now 
characteristically include.8  By their account, “[e]ach of the twenty-five most 
popular constitutional provisions appears in over 70% of all constitutions.”9  
Although the generic constitution described by Law and Versteeg overlaps with the 
Constitution of the United States to a considerable extent, significant differences 
exist.   The authors also see a clear trend line of divergence of other nation’s 
constitutions from the American model: 
[A]mong the world’s democracies . . . constitutional similarity to the United States 
has clearly gone into free fall.  Over the 1960s and 1970s, democratic constitutions 
as a whole became more similar to the U.S. Constitution, only to reverse course in 
the 1980s and 1990s.  The turn of the twenty-first century, however, saw the 
beginning of a steep plunge that continues through the most recent years for which 
we have data, to the point that the constitutions of the world’s democracies are, on 
average, less similar to the U.S. Constitution now than they were at the end of 
World War II.10 
A.  Common Divergences 
Differences between the U.S. Constitution and the constitutions of other 
countries could undoubtedly be grouped into a multitude of categories, with a 
matching plethora of explanations.  With apologies for oversimplification on many 
fronts, I would emphasize four phenomena. 
First, the constitutions of other countries increasingly deviate from the U.S. 
Constitution with respect to matters involving federalism and the separation of 
powers.  The U.S. Constitution’s assignment to the states of a quasi-sovereign 
status has not proved a popular model in other nations.11  Relatedly, the ambition of 
                                                                                                     
 6. See Law & Versteeg, supra note 2. 
 7. See id. at 809–33 (reporting that the Canadian constitution may have become a model for other 
nations in the Anglo-American tradition, but not more broadly, and that Germany, South Africa, and 
India have only limited influence). 
 8. See id. at 773 ( “The existence of a corpus of constitutional provisions that are shared by a wide 
majority of the world’s constitutions can fairly be said to define a shared, or generic global practice of 
rights constitutionalism.”). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 801. 
 11. See id. at 785–86. 
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the U.S. Constitution to assign only limited powers to the federal government—
largely in the expectation that the states would retain powers to legislate for the 
public health, safety, and welfare—has seemed to others to be an outdated residue 
of eighteenth century attitudes.12  In a world in which government is widely 
expected to play roles that the American Founding Fathers could not have foreseen, 
it has also seemed to many that the U.S. Constitution makes it too difficult for the 
federal government to exercise even such powers as it possesses.  Presidential veto 
powers make legislation more difficult here than in parliamentary systems.13  The 
design of the Senate, which allows representatives of small states to block 
legislation favored by national majorities, poses another obstacle to legislating.  In 
addition, some have blamed American-style separation of powers regimes, 
featuring an independent president, for the tendency of a number of South 
American countries to lapse repeatedly into quasi-dictatorship.14   
Second, with most of our Constitution having been written more than 200 
years ago, some of its preoccupations now strike others as dated and 
idiosyncratic.15  As a result, the constitutions of many other nations omit a number 
of provisions that the American Founding Fathers included in the Bill of Rights.  A 
plain example comes from the Seventh Amendment’s guarantee of the right to trial 
by jury in any suit at common law brought in federal court in which the amount in 
controversy exceeds twenty dollars.16  Some liberal democracies rely little, if at all, 
on the common law.  In addition, trial by jury in suits with only small sums at stake 
may seem an improvident waste of scarce resources.  Most constitutions also do not 
bother with guarantees against double jeopardy.17  Perhaps more surprising to most 
Americans, other constitutions protect individual freedom of religion, but they do  
not—like the U.S. Constitution—typically include a separate prohibition against 
the government’s supporting or respecting an establishment of religion.18  To offer 
just one more example, only about two percent of the world’s constitutions 
guarantee rights to bear arms or otherwise own guns.19 
Third, many modern constitutions contain far more, and more specific, 
guarantees of rights against governmental infringement than does the American 
Constitution,20 which squeezes most of its assurances of individual rights into the 
ten Amendments that constitute the Bill of Rights and the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, 
and Fifteenth Amendments.  Reflecting a strategy of enumerating rights with 
relatively detailed specificity, the constitutions of most liberal democracies take 
                                                                                                     
 12. See Sujit Choudhry & Nathan Hume, Federalism, Devolution, and Secession: From Classical to 
Post-Conflict Federalism, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 356, 361 (Tom Ginsburg & 
Rosalind Dixon eds., 2011) (describing such criticism of federalist systems). 
 13. See SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 38–49 (2006); see also Law & 
Versteeg, supra note 2, at 791–93 (discussing the decline of American-style presidentialism). 
 14. See, e.g., JOSE ANTONIO CHEIBUB, PRESIDENTIALISM, PARLIAMENTARIANISM, AND 
DEMOCRACY 151, 154 (2007); Scott Mainwaring, Presidentialism in Latin America, 25 LATIN AM. RES. 
REV. 157, 163 (1990). 
 15. See Law & Versteeg, supra note 2,at 852–53 & n.257. 
 16. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.   
 17. See Law & Versteeg, supra note 2, at 779 tbl.3. 
 18. See id. at 779 tbl.3, 805. 
 19. See id. at 805–06. 
 20. See id. at 804–07. 
82 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:1 
greater pains than does our Constitution to identify groups entitled to freedom from 
discrimination.21  In writing constitutions as they have, others may have taken note 
that the U.S. Constitution was construed to tolerate many forms of race-based 
discrimination until the 1950s and 1960s,22 and was read to impose no strong 
prohibition against gender-based discrimination until the 1970s.23  To cite just one 
more example, most modern constitutions provide expressly that persons accused 
of violating the criminal law enjoy a presumption of innocence.24  The Framers of 
the American Constitution may well have presupposed that there would be a 
presumption of innocence,25 but they did not insert such a prescription in the Bill of 
Rights. 
Fourth, in an age when people demand that the government do much more 
than eighteenth century Americans expected, many other constitutions have 
included guarantees of positive rights—including rights to education and welfare—
in their equivalents of our Bill of Rights.26  If a constitution seeks to guarantee its 
citizens the requisites of a dignified human life, then entitlements to housing, 
education, and medical care may seem as important as freedom from unreasonable 
searches and seizures, for example.  
B.   Has the U.S. Been Left Behind? 
As I noted at the outset, divergences between our Constitution, which was 
mostly written in the eighteenth century, and more recently adopted constitutions 
might provoke a worry that the world has left us behind, stuck at constitutionalism 
1.0, when other countries have advanced to constitutionalism 2.0 or beyond.  But 
that hypothesis is clearly false if by constitutionalism 1.0 we mean constitutional 
government as it was expected to operate in the United States at the time of the 
Constitution’s ratification.  Although our written Constitution looks much as it did 
in 1791, following the ratification of the Bill of Rights—with only 17 further 
amendments having been adopted—prevailing interpretations and related practices 
have undergone changes that would render the constitutional regime that we 
occupy today nearly unrecognizable to the Founding Fathers.   We have not only 
more government, exercising more powers, but also more rights against the 
government—many of them developed through judicial interpretation of formally 
unaltered constitutional language—than anyone could have imagined in the 
eighteenth century.27  When the reality of American government and constitutional 
practice is compared with what others’ constitutions expressly authorize, the gap 
between U.S. constitutionalism and that of other liberal democracies narrows 
considerably. 
                                                                                                     
 21. For example, over 90 percent of constitutions now specifically guarantee women’s rights.  See 
id. at 773. 
 22. See generally MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT 
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004).  
 23. See, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 289–95 (2009).  
 24. See Law & Versteeg, supra note 2, at 775. 
 25. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970). 
 26. See Law & Versteeg, supra note 2, at 806–07. 
 27. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 11–46 (1990) (describing 
the role of the federal government in creating the twentieth century’s “rights revolution”). 
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With regard to the powers of the federal government, the large deviations 
between the Framers’ expectations and the realities of modern practice involve all 
three branches.  Some measure of the increase in congressional power may come 
from the size of the federal government that Congress has created and funded.  In 
1789, the federal government had fewer than 1,000 employees.28  Today the 
number exceeds 2.7 million.29  Some of the signal events in the expansion of the 
federal government’s role occurred during the Civil War and Reconstruction,30 but 
the largest changes grew out of practical pressures that manifested themselves most 
vividly during the Great Depression and the New Deal.  During that period, 
Americans overwhelmingly concluded that the national government had to do 
more.  Without a word of relevant change in the written Constitution, Congress and 
the Supreme Court began to understand the Constitution’s conferral of 
congressional power to regulate commerce among the several states as an 
authorization for the enactment of sweeping economic regulatory legislation, 
including laws banning child labor, mandating safe working conditions, and 
establishing minimum wages.31  Based on a clause in the original Constitution that 
authorizes Congress to tax and spend for the general welfare, Congress built, and 
the Supreme Court upheld, a welfare state that would have been unimaginable prior 
to the twentieth century.32  National health insurance may be controversial, but 
Social Security and Medicare are firmly entrenched. 
At the same time that the scope of congressional authority has increased, more 
and more power has also flowed to the President.  George Washington had no 
White House staff.33  His four-member Cabinet oversaw no bureaucracy.34  The 
Army and Navy were minuscule.  As the United States grew from a fledgling 
nation to the world’s greatest economic and military power, the President claimed 
very broad commander-in-chief powers, especially during the Cold War and its 
                                                                                                     
 28. Formal statistics on total federal employment before 1816 are not available. See BUREAU OF THE 
CENSUS, 2 HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970 1103 (1975).  
One detailed review of available records puts the number of federal employees at 780 in 1792, not 
including deputy postmasters, who likely numbered several hundred.  See LEONARD D. WHITE, THE 
FEDERALISTS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY 255 (1948).  Many authors writing on the size of 
government in the early republic casually estimate there were around 1,000 employees.  See, e.g., Bruce 
D. Porter, Parkinson’s Law Revisited: War and the Growth of American Government, THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST, Summer 1980, at 50 (putting the number at “approximately 1,000”). 
 29. Federal Employment Statistics, Historical Federal Workforce Tables, Total Government 
Employment Since 1962, U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT., 
http://www.opm.gov/feddata/HistoricalTables/TotalGovernmentSince1962.asp (lasted visited Oct. 15, 
2012). 
 30. See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber, Political Unity and the Powers of Government, 41 UCLA L. 
REV. 1297, 1329 (1994) (noting that “the Civil War and the Reconstruction Amendments radically 
altered the relationship between constitutional authority and state sovereignty”). 
 31. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 310–11 (2000); FRIEDMAN, 
supra note 23, at 212–29. 
 32. See, e.g., Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 
(1937). 
 33. See Thomas Engeman & Raymond Tatalovich, George Washington: The First Modern 
President? A Reply to Nichols, in GEORGE WASHINGTON AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN 
PRESIDENCY 37, 61 (Mark J. Rozell et al. eds., 2000). 
 34. Id. 
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aftermath.35  In the domestic sphere, too, Congress has delegated power to the 
President that would have been unthinkable to the Founding generation.  The 
clearest example involves rule-making.  Today the President oversees a myriad of 
rule-making agencies, with the power to promulgate what are for all practical 
purposes laws of the United States.36 
The judiciary has also grown more powerful and, in exercising its powers, has 
given us many of the individual rights that today we think of as most 
fundamental.37  By nearly all accounts, we have free speech rights that far exceed 
the Framers’ expectations.  The one-person, one-vote decisions38—which now 
seem indispensable to fair political democracy—would have been equally 
unanticipated by those who wrote and ratified any provision of the Constitution.  
When the Constitution was written in 1787 and the Bill of Rights was added in 
1791, no provision forbade discrimination on the basis of race or gender, and when 
the Equal Protection Clause was added in 1868, it said that no state shall deny 
anyone the equal protection of the laws, but made no reference to the federal 
government.39  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has held the federal government to 
the same equal protection norms as it has the states, with the curt explanation that 
any other result would be “unthinkable.”40  It is easy to forget, but Brown v. Board 
of Education,41 which came nearly a century after the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, almost certainly deviated from that provision’s original 
understanding.42  Following the Equal Protection Clause’s ratification, a large 
number of states either continued or initiated segregation, apparently confident that 
the Fourteenth Amendment erected no bar.43  And no one appears to have thought 
in 1868 that the Equal Protection Clause barred gender-based discrimination.44  
Yet, beginning in the 1970s, the Court has subjected sex discrimination to elevated 
judicial scrutiny.45  It would be easy to pile up many more examples of judicially 
recognized constitutional rights that far exceed the Framers’ expectations. 
Indeed, if we ask which rights our Constitution omits that the constitutions of 
                                                                                                     
 35. See, e.g., ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973). 
 36. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2282–84 (2001). 
 37. The remainder of the paragraph draws heavily on the accounts of incompatibility between 
current doctrine and the Framers’ intent or the original understanding of constitutional language 
contained in DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010), and Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare 
Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L REV. 723, 727–39 (1988).   
 38. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); 
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).  
 39. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 40. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). 
 41. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 42. See, e.g., Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. 
REV. 213, 252 & n.180 (1991).  For a rare dissent from this consensus view, see Michael W. 
McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 953 (1995). 
 43. See Klarman, supra note 42, at 252.  
 44. But cf. Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. 
REV. 1 (2011) (distinguishing between the original meaning of the Equal Protection Clause and original 
expectations concerning its application and arguing that its original public meaning forbade sex-based 
discrimination that tended to subordinate women even if most of the public did not so apprehend in 
1868). 
 45. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976). 
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other liberal democracies now include, and look at the omissions that Professors 
Law and Versteeg identify, we find that more than half the time—in six of the 
eleven cases that they cite—our Supreme Court, through interpretation, has given 
us almost precisely the rights that Law and Versteeg say our Constitution lacks:46 
• Despite the absence of a formally denominated “freedom of movement,” 
the Supreme Court has long upheld a constitutionally protected right to 
travel;47 
• Even though no bit of constitutional text expressly guarantees a 
“presumption of innocence,” judicial decisions clearly recognize that 
requiring a criminal defendant to carry the burden of proof in a criminal 
case violates the Due Process Clause;48 
• The First Amendment does not refer to the “freedom of association,” but a 
myriad of cases find such a right to be an implied functional entailment of 
the freedom of speech;49 
• The term “judicial review” does not appear in the Constitution, but the 
federal courts have exercised that power at least since Marbury v. 
Madison;50 
• Although there is no separate constitutional guarantee of “women’s 
rights,” the Supreme Court has held that discrimination against women 
triggers elevated judicial scrutiny,51 and it has also recognized abortion 
rights;52 and  
• An asserted absence of “limits on property rights” needs to be qualified 
even in its own terms in light of the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment, which allows the taking of private property for public 
purposes as long as just compensation is paid,53 and the Supreme Court 
has long held that the use of private property can be regulated.54 
Some of the rights that the modern Supreme Court has recognized are of 
course fiercely controversial.  Those on the political right recurrently denounce Roe 
v. Wade,55 which upheld abortion rights, and Lawrence v. Texas,56 which barred 
criminal prosecutions for private acts of homosexual intimacy among consenting 
                                                                                                     
 46. See Law & Versteeg, supra note 2, at 779 (listing eleven “[p]rovisions found only in the generic 
bill of rights” and not in the United States Constitution: “[f]reedom of movement,” “[r]ight not to be 
expelled from home territory,” “[p]resumption of innocence,” “[r]ight of association,” “[e]stablishment 
of judicial review,” “[r]ight to work,” “[r]ight to unionize and/or strike,” “[p]hysical needs rights,” 
“[r]ight to education,” “[w]omen’s rights,” and “[l]imits on property rights”). 
 47. See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 498 (1999); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 48-
49 (1867). 
 48. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362-64 (1970). 
 49. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647-48 (2000); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 
U.S. 449 (1958). 
 50. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 51. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532-34 (1996). 
 52. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113, 154 (1973). 
 53. U.S. Const. amend. V.   
 54. See, e.g., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124-25 (1978). 
 55. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 56. 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
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adults.  From the other side of the political spectrum come protests against Citizens 
United v. Federal Election Commission,57 which overturned prohibitions against 
corporate spending on political campaigns, and District of Columbia v. Heller,58 
which invalidated a prohibition against the possession of handguns.  Nor, I should 
add, is controversy about the growth and exercise of governmental power under the 
Constitution limited to the judicial branch.  There are vehement critics of the 
modern, quasi-imperial presidency59 and, increasingly, of the regulatory authority 
that Congress has asserted since the New Deal.60 
But these criticisms reinforce, rather than detract from, the principal point that 
I wish to make.  As a result of evolution and occasionally startling innovation, we 
stand a lot closer to constitutionalism 2.0—as defined by what Professors Law and 
Versteeg characterize as the “generic constitution” predominantly preferred by 
modern liberal democracies—than anyone who just looked at the words of our 
written Constitution would ever guess. 
C.  Constitutionalism 1.8 
Proximity is not, of course, identity.  Although we come close to 
constitutionalism 2.0 in some respects, gaps remain in others.  To begin with, there 
are clearly some important elements of “American exceptionalism,”61 marking 
matters with respect to which many Americans would take pride in our outlier 
status.  Insofar as structural matters are concerned, some aspects of the American 
constitutional design that have worked poorly or seemed unattractive elsewhere—
including our versions of federalism and the separation of powers62—have not only 
retained their appeal, but also functioned with tolerable success, here.  
Moreover, many Americans may have exceptional views about which rights a 
constitution ought to protect.  For example, many and even most Americans may 
cherish a constitutionally enshrined right to keep and bear arms, even if 
constitution-writers in other countries would regard such a right as anachronistic at 
best.63  Similarly, American political majorities might respond charily to proposals 
to give constitutional status to “positive” rights to education, employment, welfare, 
or health care that many modern constitutions now incorporate.  For better or for 
worse, the notion that individuals should be self-reliant, or that care for the 
disadvantaged is more a matter of local or charitable than of national responsibility, 
may remain stronger in the United States than in most of the rest of the world.64 
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Perhaps more important, however, is that the American Constitution—most of 
which was written in the eighteenth century—has achieved much of the 
functionality that makes it workable for and attractive to Americans in the twenty-
first century largely through a process of interpretation that has involved striking 
deviations from the Framers’ expectations.  Although I do not want to delve deeply 
into matters of interpretive theory, three patterns are evident. 
First, in a number of cases the Supreme Court has brought the United States 
into relatively close alignment with other liberal democracies by giving 
constitutional language interpretations that are linguistically plausible in the 
twenty-first century, but that diverge considerably from what most members of the 
Founding generation would have anticipated.  Examples include modern doctrine 
under the Commerce Clause, the Taxing and Spending Clause, and the Equal 
Protection Clause.  Members of the Founding generation could not have foreseen 
modern economic and environmental legislation justified under the power “[t]o 
regulate Commerce … among the several States,”65 or welfare bureaucracies 
defended as exercises of the authority “[t]o lay and collect Taxes … to … provide 
for the … general Welfare of the United States,”66 even if the language that the 
Framers used permits these results.  Nor did those who wrote and ratified the Equal 
Protection Clause contemplate its application to bar a variety of discriminations 
against women.  
In other cases the Court has stretched constitutional language to the outer 
boundaries of linguistic plausibility.  In the view of some, paper money furnishes 
an example.  The relevant constitutional language authorizes Congress to “coin 
Money,”67 yet the Supreme Court has held that Congress can print money as well.68  
A more widely recognized example of linguistic stretching comes from the Due 
Process Clause.  Although the language seems to impose only a requirement that 
the government employ fair or regular procedures before effecting deprivations of 
liberty or property, the Supreme Court has construed it as protecting a number of 
substantive rights.  These include rights to marry,69 to control the upbringing of 
one’s children,70 to have access to abortions,71 and to be free from unfair 
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88 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:1 
discrimination by the federal government on the basis of race or gender.72  The 
Court has also identified the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as 
the provision that “incorporates” those substantive guarantees of the Bill of Rights 
that qualify as “fundamental” and thus makes them applicable against the states.73  
Perhaps needless to say, our constitutional order would be vastly different, and less 
attractive, if the states could violate the central guarantees of the Bill of Rights. 
Once having departed from the expectations of the Founding generation in an 
initial case, the Court has frequently proceeded to develop and extend sometimes 
elaborate doctrines principally on the basis of its own accreting precedents.  For 
example, the Court today typically decides voting rights cases brought under the 
Equal Protection Clause based on prior equal protection cases involving voting 
rights,74 without regard to whether the earlier decisions accurately reflected the 
original constitutional understanding—as they almost surely did not.75  As case 
builds upon case, complex rule structures sometimes take shape.  These often 
include judge-made tests, including “strict judicial scrutiny,” that the authors and 
ratifiers of relevant constitutional language surely did not foresee.76   
When we see how much of our currently operative constitutional regime 
depends on contestable (which is not to say erroneous) interpretive exercises, it 
becomes easy to grasp why other liberal democracies would not want to write their 
constitutions to look like the Constitution of the United States, even when they 
might approve of contemporary U.S. constitutional practice and doctrine.  Where 
feasible, it would almost always seem more sensible to adopt constitutional 
language that speaks straightforwardly to modern issues, and reflects modern 
understandings of individual rights and the powers of government, than to copy 
eighteenth-century language and rely on interpretive maneuvers—some 
controversial, either initially or enduringly—to close the gap. 
II.  WHAT LESSONS CAN WE LEARN? 
Even if we can well understand why other nations would now want 
constitutions that look on the surface to be increasingly different from ours, it 
would be easy—by emphasizing the twenty-first century functionality of the 
Constitution of the United States—to drift, especially in a Constitution Day lecture, 
into a narrative of national self-congratulation.  According to a familiar account, 
the real genius of the Founding Fathers was to give us a flexible Constitution, 
capable of evolution over time.  What is more, a congratulatory narrative would 
continue, we should not reserve our praise for the Founding Fathers alone.  Giving 
credit where credit is due, we should also celebrate the continuing, practical genius 
of the American people, including presidents and Justices of the Supreme Court, 
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who have found a way to make the Constitution continue to work for us more than 
two centuries after it was written. 
In my view, this congratulatory assessment of U.S. constitutionalism contains 
important elements of truth.  But if we think about celebrations of constitutional 
adaptability in light of other nations’ preference for constitutions that more directly 
address contemporary challenges and reflect contemporary values, we may develop 
a sharpened awareness of the pitfalls of the path that the United States has 
followed.  An honest account of our current constitutional situation needs to 
recognize that we subsist in a state of practical, political, and legal tension that 
from time to time threatens to erupt into a legitimacy crisis, either for the judiciary 
or for the other branches of government. 
To speak somewhat summarily, we have a two-part problem.  First, we face a 
recurring conundrum in seeking to reconcile the practical imperative of 
constitutional adaptability with our obligations of fidelity to the Constitution as 
written—obligations that nearly everyone recognizes as genuine.77  Although I 
have celebrated the dynamic flexibility of the United States Constitution as it has 
historically been interpreted, a familiar understanding of the ideal of the rule of law 
holds that law, including constitutional law, should have a fixed and determinate 
meaning that binds judges as well as other officials until the law has been formally 
changed.78  I have written about interpretive theory in the past, and will say a few 
more things shortly.  But what most bears emphasis for the moment is that 
reconciling fidelity with interpretive flexibility is everyone’s challenge, 
experienced by liberals and conservatives alike. 
Modern liberals obviously want adaptive understandings of governmental 
powers.  They also defend, and call for the recognition of, many rights that the 
Framers would not have viewed the Constitution as protecting.  But virtually no 
liberal would say that the Constitution’s text and the original understanding of 
constitutional language do not matter.79 
Although conservatives are more likely than liberals to declare themselves 
constitutional originalists, who believe as a general matter that modern 
constitutional interpretation should reflect the original understanding or original 
public meaning of constitutional language,80 most are as committed as liberals to 
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retaining some constitutional adaptations that have occurred in the past, such as 
those that have authorized Social Security, Medicare, and paper money.81  
Conservatives typically defend a far more expansive First Amendment doctrine 
than the Framers would have expected.82  They want to apply equal protection 
norms against the federal government, despite the absence of support in the original 
understanding of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.83  Similarly, few 
conservatives would wish to upset the settled understanding that the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates most Bill of Rights guarantees 
and makes them applicable against the states.84 
In order to permit such accommodations, even most originalists acknowledge 
that the Framers’ expectations cannot be controlling in every case.  Some would 
dilute their theories by affirming that obligations of adherence to precedent can 
sometimes prevail over originally understood meanings.85  Others draw a 
distinction between the original “public meaning” of constitutional language and 
original understandings concerning how constitutional language would be 
applied.86  With this distinction in place, they argue that those who wrote and 
ratified constitutional language may sometimes have failed to grasp the full import 
of its meaning, and may thus have misapplied it.  On this view, it may become 
possible to say that the original public meaning of the Equal Protection Clause 
forbade some discriminations that the authors and ratifiers tolerated87 or that the 
original meaning of the First Amendment’s free speech guarantee extended to types 
of utterances that the Founding generation mistakenly deemed unprotected. 
Given the need to reconcile constitutional adaptability with fidelity to the 
Constitution as written, we should not be surprised that there are many varieties of 
self-styled constitutional “originalists,” just as there are of nonoriginalists.88 There 
is no obvious, reasonably determinate answer to the question of how to bring these 
                                                                                                     
Originalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 371 (2007); Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent With Original 
Meaning: Not as Radical as It Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 257-58 (2005). 
 81. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF 
LEGAL TEXTS, 411–12 (2012) (acknowledging that originalist interpretive theories should make 
exceptions for cases governed by stare decisis and “not propose that all decision made … in the past half 
century or so of unrestrained constitutional improvisation be set aside”); ROBERT H. BORK, THE 
TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 158 (1990) (“[I]t is too late to 
overrule not only the decision legalizing paper money but also those decisions validating certain New 
Deal and Great Society programs pursuant to the constitutional powers over commerce, taxation, and 
spending.”).   
 82. See, e.g., STRAUSS, supra note37, at 61 (noting the narrowness of the Framers’ understandings 
of freedom of speech).   
 83. For example, in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), the Justices who are 
conventionally denominated as conservatives all joined in holding that federal affirmative action 
programs trigger strict judicial scrutiny under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
 84. See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 81, at 413.  
 85. See, e.g., id. at 411–14; BORK, supra note 81, at 158–59.  
 86. See, e.g., Calabresi & Rickert, supra, at 4–11; Lawrence B. Solum, We Are All Originalists 
Now, in ROBERT W. BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE 1, 
10–11 (2011). 
 87. See, e.g., Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 44, at 4-11. 
 88. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Are Originalist Constitutional Theories Principled, Or Are 
They Rationalizations for Conservatism?, 34 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 7, 14 (2011); Thomas B. Colby 
& Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 244–45 (2009).     
2012] AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 2.0 91 
two imperatives into alignment with one another.  Disagreement abounds.  Indeed, 
there may not even be agreement that I have stated the interpretive challenge 
precisely accurately.  But we should not let points of thoroughly understandable 
disagreement obscure the large points that we all ought to recognize: Judges and 
commentators of all political stripes are struggling with what is in essence the same 
problem, even if they sometimes describe it differently, and the differences in the 
answers that they provide are much more nuanced than categorical.  No one wants 
constitutional adaptation to the exclusion of constitutional fidelity, or fidelity to the 
exclusion of adaptation.  Tension between the competing demands of fidelity and 
adaptation is endemic to the interpretation and implementation of an eighteenth 
century constitution in a twenty-first century world. 
A second, related problem of contemporary American constitutionalism 
involves politically based judging.  In deciding whether constitutional adaptation is 
necessary, warranted, justified, or desirable, judges and Justices inevitably make 
contestable determinations that increasingly appear ideologically tinged.  
Conservative Supreme Court Justices, mostly appointed by Republican presidents, 
tend to coalesce in important case after important case.  Liberal Justices, mostly 
appointed by Democrats, tend to follow a similar pattern.  Yes, the Court decides 
many cases unanimously,89 but typically when the stakes are relatively low.  In 
cases involving abortion, affirmative action, campaign finance regulation, gun 
control, and the outer limits of federal regulatory power, there are identifiably 
conservative and identifiably liberal positions, and we typically know in advance in 
which camp each of the Justices will line up.90   It may give temporary comfort 
when a Supreme Court nominee describes the job to which he aspires as being 
closely analogous to that of an umpire calling balls and strikes.91  On reflection, 
however, we know better.  
When judging appears partisan, public confidence in the judicial branch, and 
its members, understandably suffers.  Whenever the President nominates someone 
to serve on the Supreme Court, opponents charge that the nominee is a reckless 
ideological partisan.  In light of the recurrent attacks, it is little wonder that, by 
early 2012, the Supreme Court’s approval ratings from the American public—
which once routinely ran far ahead of those for the President and Congress—had 
fallen to forty-four percent.92 
In saying that our current constitutional framework—which I have 
characterized as constitutionalism 1.8—leaves us struggling with twin problems of 
reconciling constitutional fidelity with adaptability and of avoiding political 
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judging, I do not mean to suggest that these problems would be wholly absent in 
any constitutional regime.  Drafters of constitutions may frequently need to paper 
over differences in order to attain the requisite public support.93  To a greater or 
lesser extent, this strategy, where it is used, will inevitably leave politically charged 
issues to be resolved by the courts.   Nevertheless, I believe that the age of our 
Constitution, and the resulting pressure to find interpretations that are attractive and 
workable in the twenty-first century, exacerbate some of the problems that would 
exist under a more modern constitution drafted with modern problems in mind. 
III.  HOW SHOULD WE GO ON FROM HERE? 
If I am right in my diagnosis of two important problems that arise recurrently 
under constitutionalism 1.8, the question becomes how we should go on from here.  
In my view, we have no ideal option.  A return to constitutionalism 1.0—which 
would mean the kind of constitutional regime that the Founding generation 
anticipated—should be regarded as out of the question.  The consequences could be 
disastrous, as originalists who find ways to temper or moderate their originalism 
realize.  As Justice Scalia has been quoted as saying, differentiating himself and I 
believe most originalists from those who would like to return to constitutionalism 
1.0, “I am an originalist . . . but I am not a nut.”94 
There is also no realistic prospect of our quickly getting a newly minted and 
updated Constitution, proposed by a Constitutional Convention and ratified by 
three-quarters of the states.95  In other words, a roll-out of constitutionalism 2.0 
(American style) is not in the cards. Even under the best of circumstances, the 
requirement that three-fourths of the states must ratify constitutional amendments 
makes it nearly impossible to achieve significant change in our written Constitution 
through the Article V process.96  We do not, moreover, inhabit the best of 
circumstances.  Our politics are too polarized.   
Accordingly, if we are currently working with constitutionalism 1.8, we should 
think more modestly about the kind of relatively minor upgrade that would help to 
alleviate our must urgent current problems.  On Constitution Day 2012, we should 
turn our thoughts to imagining an American constitutionalism 1.9 that would solve 
the leading problems of our current version 1.8.  Even with the challenge defined in 
these relatively modest terms, I have no more than a sketch of a suggestion of how 
we might proceed.  But let me offer a few tentative thoughts. 
First, recognizing the practical imperative of adaptation, we should embrace an 
understanding of the nature of law and the obligation of fidelity to law that explains 
how interpretive evolution, within reasonable limits, is lawful and legitimate.  In 
jurisprudence, or the philosophy of law, there are rival accounts.  One equates law 
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with the command of the sovereign, or lawgiver, and associates fidelity to law with 
obeying the commands of the lawgiver.97  Some versions of originalism asks us 
always to obey the commands of the Framers—as defined by their understandings 
or expectations—even when adherence to those commands as thus construed would 
be archaic or dysfunctional.  By contrast, a different, better account of the nature of 
law equates law with ongoing practices of adherence to socially established and 
enforced norms of legality that can change over time.98  The reason that the 
Constitution is law today is not that the Framers decreed that it should have that 
status.  King George and the British Parliament issued similar decrees.  What 
distinguishes the Constitution from the decrees of King George is that the 
Constitution is today accepted as law—by judges, officials, and the American 
public.99  And, to state a complex claim as simply as possible, Americans have long 
accepted the Constitution as law subject to the proviso that it need not and should 
not be interpreted to reach practically intolerable results in the current age.100 
Second, having acknowledged that evolution in constitutional understandings 
can be legitimate and desirable, not a vaguely shameful concession to grim 
necessity, we should also recognize that the challenge of defining our obligations 
of fidelity to the Constitution, and of accommodating fidelity with adaptability, is 
one that very understandably provokes reasonable differences of opinion.101  This 
may seem a banal observation, but you would not necessarily know it from reading 
Supreme Court opinions in divided cases.  Even when the Court splits five to four, 
the contending opinions typically read as if there could be no doubt about the 
result; the majority and the dissenters just differ about what the indisputably correct 
result is.  The explanation for this phenomenon may inhere partly in traditional 
conventions of opinion-writing.  Eagerness on the part of judges and Justices to 
cast themselves as disinterested oracles of the law may lead them to overstate the 
cases for the conclusions that they reach.  Recent work in cognitive psychology 
provides another partial explanation for dueling majority and dissenting opinions 
that both portray the matter in issue as beyond all reasonable doubt.  Once having 
settled on a conclusion, the human mind tends to suppress residual reminders of 
grounds for uncertainty.102  Nevertheless, the Justices are men and women of 
extraordinary intelligence, trained professionally to engage in critical analysis of all 
arguments on all sides.  Doing so, they could, and should, acknowledge the 
reasonableness of disagreement and write opinions that frankly acknowledge the 
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difficulty of many of the questions that come before them.103 
Third, understanding the reasonableness of disagreement, we should demand 
that our judges and Justices adopt a stronger presumption that any reasonable 
constitutional judgments made by Congress and the state legislatures in enacting 
statutes are constitutionally valid.  The Supreme Court recurrently recites that 
legislative acts, and especially acts of Congress, enjoy a presumption of 
constitutionality.104  Very often, however, the presumption appears to be little more 
than a tie-breaker, if that.  At least in our current circumstances of sharp ideological 
division, the unwillingness of the Justices to display more deference or “restraint” 
in cases of reasonable constitutional doubt seems regrettable.105  Among other 
drawbacks, unyielding stances by the Justices can only exacerbate our slide into a 
situation in which judging not only is perceived to be, but may actually become, 
more and more political in a troubling sense of that term.106  No one should think 
that what is best about American constitutionalism 1.8 is that it bestows sweeping 
powers on narrow majorities of an ideologically divided Supreme Court to impose 
their views, in the name of the Constitution, in otherwise contestable cases. 
In suggesting that the Supreme Court should show more restraint in 
invalidating legislation in cases of reasonable constitutional disagreement, I make 
no pretense of originality.  The idea is an old one, perhaps as old as the 
Constitution itself.107  It has had many famous champions, including James Bradley 
Thayer108 and Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.109  But if the idea of judicial 
restraint is not new, it seems to me to be peculiarly well suited to current times, for 
it addresses both of the fundamental problems that I identified as characteristic of 
constitutionalism 1.8.  First, an enhanced presumption of constitutionality would 
alleviate political judging.  It would not only permit judges, but require them, to 
uphold the constitutionality of legislation of which they disapprove on policy 
grounds.  Indeed, it would sometimes require them to do so even in full awareness 
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that there are reasonable constitutional arguments that would let them vote to 
invalidate that legislation. 
Second, an enhanced presumption of constitutionality would address the 
problem of reconciling adaptability with fidelity by acknowledging the 
reasonableness of disagreement about many if not most contentious issues.  In 
cases of reasonable disagreement, the presumption of constitutionality would 
reflect the premise that it will ordinarily be fairer to let democratically accountable 
officials decide how the Constitution is appropriately applied and adapted than to 
have unelected judges dictate the outcome when their views are just as contestable 
as the judgments that they would displace.  Although I have previously argued that 
the best philosophical justification for judicial review depends on the assumption 
that it is better for rights to be overenforced than underenforced, and that there 
should therefore be multiple “veto points” at which different institutions can thwart 
the enactment and enforcement of rights-threatening legislation, “[r]elatively 
deferential review is … an option” consistent with that general strategy.110  
Whatever might be true under other circumstances, the option of an enhanced 
presumption of constitutionality responds to the difficulties of American 
constitutionalism 1.8 better than the less deferential attitudes that typically 
characterize contemporary practice. 
In proposing that we should re-embrace the old idea of “judicial restraint” at 
this particular time, I have a contemporary example of reliance on the presumption 
of constitutionality very much in mind.  An apprehension that the Supreme Court 
should not become too ideologically identifiable an institution, and should defer to 
Congress in cases of reasonable constitutional disagreement, helps to explain some 
of the admiring responses to Chief Justice John Roberts’s recent decision 
upholding the so-called Individual Mandate to purchase health insurance in the 
Affordable Care Act (“ACA”).111  Some of the applause undoubtedly came from 
those who thought the ACA clearly, indisputably constitutional.  But some also 
came from people who understood that there were powerful arguments both ways 
and who believed, under those circumstances, that an ideologically divided 
Supreme Court—with the Justices’ ideologies largely tracking those of the 
presidents who appointed them—should not strike down so momentous an Act of 
Congress.112 
In the ACA case, reliance on the presumption of constitutionality produced 
what might be characterized as a “liberal” result.  But if I am right that the current 
terms of our constitutional debates leave us perennially at the brink of 
constitutional crisis, and that the best strategy for escaping this predicament lies in 
more judicial deference to legislative judgments, then liberals, as well as 
conservatives, should relax their expectations of what they can properly achieve 
through the courts.  In the now-prevailing state of affairs, liberals and conservatives 
seem roughly equally eager to see courts invalidate legislation that they dislike.  
The principal difference is that they dislike different kinds of legislation.  
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Conservatives oppose gun control laws, statutes authorizing affirmative action, 
restrictions on corporate speech, and a variety of environmental and economic 
regulatory laws.  By contrast, liberals want courts to strike down laws imposing 
capital punishment, regulating abortion, and banning or withholding recognition of 
gay marriage.  If common ground is to be found, and if the Supreme Court is to 
cease dividing along predictable ideological lines in a disheartening number of 
cases, then the presumption of constitutionality should be applied in ways that 
would disappoint liberals and conservatives alike, in roughly comparable numbers 
of instances. 
Who should yield on which issues?  Having endorsed an enhanced 
presumption of constitutionality, I must reiterate my confession that I have no full 
theory to offer, only a pastiche of scattered thoughts.  It is not my view that the 
presumption of constitutionality should never yield to other considerations, even in 
cases of reasonable disagreement.  Applied across the board, a theory demanding 
judicial deference in all cases would imply that the Supreme Court overstepped in 
many past decisions that now are acclaimed centerpieces of American 
constitutional jurisprudence.  These include, for example, many paradigms of 
modern First Amendment law, the one-person, one-vote cases, the ruling 
establishing that impoverished criminal defendants have a right to court-appointed 
lawyers, and many of the leading cases—including Brown v. Board of 
Education113—that establish prohibitions against race- and gender-based 
discrimination. 
The most historically celebrated effort to identify appropriate conditions of 
deference and non-deference—in Footnote Four of the Carolene Products case,114 
especially as elaborated by John Hart Ely115—offers some useful markers.  In 
particular, deference seems inappropriate in cases involving legislation that 
somehow impedes the fair operation of the political process—for example, when 
incumbent legislators limit free speech or voting rights.  If courts are to defer to the 
political process, they should minimally ensure that the political process operates 
fairly, and they should exercise substantially independent judgment in doing so.116  
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Ely also argued that the courts should withhold deference in cases in which 
legislation discriminates against discrete and insular minorities.117  According to 
Ely, the possibility of prejudice against minorities renders the legislature unworthy 
of deference in cases involving asserted minority rights.  As an intuitive matter, his 
proposal to withhold judicial deference in cases involving alleged infringements of 
minority rights sounds attractive.  It would be obtuse to deny that the American 
past has included widespread, prejudice-driven discrimination based on race and 
religion that the Supreme Court has rightly sought to combat.  As an analytical 
matter, however, it is often difficult to distinguish prejudiced enactments that 
courts should strike down from legislative exercises of moral judgment to which 
judicial deference is due.118  Nothing that I have said so far pretends to resolve that 
difficulty. 
Nor, as I have said, am I confident that courts should defer in all other cases in 
which constitutional disagreement falls within the category of the “reasonable.”  
Looking back at some of the Supreme Court’s past cases of non-deferential 
decisionmaking, I am inclined to believe that the Justices, in determining when the 
presumption of constitutionality is overcome, would be right to give weight to 
considerations of what they take to be practical and moral urgency, even if others 
might view the matter differently.  Especially if I am right on this point, judgment 
must always come into play, and there is no avoiding its sometimes having a 
political component.  Nevertheless, the fact that qualifications of this kind are 
necessary does not signal a need for retreat from my basic submission: In cases of 
reasonable constitutional disagreement, judges and Justices should apply a more 
robust presumption of constitutionality than they frequently do today.  
Although I wish I were prepared to offer more determinate prescriptions, I 
make no apology for suggesting that we should proceed for the time being by 
tinkering only modestly with the Constitution, and the practices of constitutional 
interpretation, that we currently have in place.  Once again, this does not seem to 
me a propitious time to propose a quantum leap into a dramatically new era of 
American constitutionalism.  It is, however, a wholly apt time to ask: How can we 
design a better version of American constitutionalism—call it constitutionalism 
1.9—that will more successfully combine pragmatic adaptation with fidelity to the 
constitutional text in an era in which judgments about what count as sound and 
sensible adaptations are likely to be ideologically charged?  
IV.  CONCLUSION:  A LAST LOOK IN THE MIRROR 
By way of conclusion, let me remind you of the road we have traveled to reach 
the question that I have just stated and with which I want to leave you. 
I began by noting that constitution-writers in other nations have ceased to view 
the United States Constitution as a preeminent model and then asked whether we, 
as Americans, could learn any useful lessons from comparing the U.S. Constitution 
and surrounding interpretive practices with the “generic constitution” that 
represents most other liberal democracies’ current consensus about constitutional 
matters.  In addressing this question, I briefly considered the hypothesis that the 
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U.S. Constitution, most of which was written in the eighteenth century, leaves us 
stuck in the equivalent of constitutionalism 1.0 when most of the rest of the world 
has advanced to constitutionalism 2.0.  But this hypothesis withers under scrutiny.  
We are far beyond constitutionalism 1.0, as defined by the constitutional regime of 
the early Republic and the set of understandings that surrounded it; we inhabit 
something more analogous to what I have loosely and metaphorically categorized 
as American constitutionalism 1.8.  Through adaptive interpretation, political 
leaders, judges, and the American people have found ways to endow our 
Constitution with twenty-first century rather than eighteenth-century functionality.  
We have not only more extensive rights than eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
Americans did, but also a more empowered national government in both its 
legislative and its executive aspects.  But the adaptations that have been necessary 
to make our Constitution workable in the twenty-first century have created a 
tension, still not adequately resolved, about how to reconcile adaptability with 
fidelity to the Constitution’s written text and original understanding.  When 
Americans are broadly (even if never unanimously) united about which adaptations 
reason requires, American constitutionalism 1.8 works very well.  But when unity 
breaks down, and constitutional judgments appear to be ideological and partisan, 
then American constitutionalism 1.8 begins to look clunky and occasionally 
dysfunctional.  Is it any wonder that other nations would opt for twenty-first 
century constitutions that are more expressly designed to address twenty-first 
century challenges? 
Reflecting on these matters on Constitution Day 2012, we have a Constitution 
that we can be proud of.  But our operating system, which I have characterized as 
American constitutionalism 1.8, is tension-ridden and needful of improvement.  As 
American citizens and constitutional loyalists, we should go forth from our 
Constitution Day celebrations thinking creatively about the challenges of living 
with a Constitution that was originally designed in the eighteenth century in a 
twenty-first century world. 
 
